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Can Corporations Be Held Liable
Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?
Kelsy Deye'
T HE Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) was a statute passed in 17892 that
few attorneys knew much about and even fewer argued in suits prior
to 1980.3 The first Congress passed the ATCA as a jurisdictional statute
to open federal courts to tort claims by aliens of the United States. 4 The
courts had invoked the ATCA only twice since its passage as part of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 until I980. 5 With the Second Circuit's groundbreak-
ing opinion in Filartiga v. Pena-hrala,6 the scope, use, and interpretation of
the Alien Tort Claims Act changed.7 Later cases showed that this shift had
the strongest impact on the hot-button international issue of human right
violations.' Leaders of insurgent groups, terrorist groups, and government
officials were all subject to litigation under the ATCA for actions in foreign
countries. 9 Lack of official capacity was not even a requirement, so an in-
dividual could be held liable for his personal actions in committing human
rights violations like genocide, rape, and murder.'0 The U.S. court system
opened an avenue for non-citizens to sue for events happening completely
outside the boundaries of the United States." People with no practical re-
course in their native country's courts had an alternate forum to submit
i J.D. expected 2007, University of Kentucky College of Law.
2 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (zooo).
3 See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, The Supreme Court Meets International Law: What's the Sequel
to Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain?, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 77, 77 (2004); see also M. Christie
Helmer et al., Litigation Claims Under the Alien Tort Statute After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 721
PLI/LIT 121, 123 (March zoo5).
4 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 719-20 (2004).
5 Hufbauer, supra note 3, at 77.
6 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 Ezd 876 (2d Cir. 198o)
7 See William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations on
Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 687,687 (2002).
8 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F3d 232 (zd Cir. 1995);Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.zd 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.zd 876 (zd Cir. 198o).
9 Id.
io See Kadic, 70 F3d at 244.
i i Filartiga, 630 Ezd at 885.
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grievances. '2 Since Filartiga, courts have been wrestling with the outside
boundary of the ATCA, such as who may be held liable and how closely an
actor must be associated with the foreign government to incur liability for
a human rights violation.
Until recently, the ATCA has been limited to official and unofficial ac-
tors of foreign governments.' 3 Several suits-filed in the last five years sought
to extend the ATCA to cover actions by multinational corporations in for-
eign countries.' 4 These suits have led to a new host of problems for courts
in interpreting the ATCA. Prior to the Supreme Court ruling in Sosa v. Al-
varez-Machain, lower courts had no guidance as to which interpretations of
the ATCA were constitutionally valid.'5 While the Supreme Court cleared
up some basic ideas regarding the interpretati6n of the ATCA, questions
regarding corporations remain unanswered due to the facts of the case.
With the guidance provided in Sosa, courts continue to grapple with evolv-
ing standards of customary international law and the subsequent effects on
suits against corporations for violations of human rights on foreign soil.
This Note evaluates whether private actors can be held liable under
the ATCA for human rights violations. The passage of the Act, the his-
tory of litigation under it, and the international law violations defined by
it indicate that individual liability exists. Next, the Note discusses Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain and its effect on the modern interpretation of the ATCA.
Finally, the Note examines litigation against U.S. corporations and the pos-
sible liability of these multinational corporations for activities occurring in
foreign locations where the corporations do business.
I. THE ORIGIN OF THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS AcT
Congress passed the ATCA as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The de-
bates in Congress at that time indicate that the legislative body intended
personal liability to arise under the act.' 6 Additionally, events occurring in
Philadelphia at the time confirm that Congress sought to make individuals
liable under the ATCA.' 7
James Madison worried that a crisis was emerging for the United States
in international affairs because the country had failed to provide punish-
1 2 Id. at 879-880, 885.
13 See Hufbauer, supra note 3, at 77-
14 See In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004);
Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003), republished at 414 F3d 233
(2d Cir. 2003); Doe I v. Unocal Corp. 395 F3d 932 (9th Cir. 2oo2), vacated and reh'g en bane, 395
F3d 978 (2003); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000).
15 Tel-Oren, 726 F.d at 775.
16 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724-25.
17 Dodge, supra note 7, at 694.
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ments for violations of the law of nations.'8 The law of nations, also referred
to asjus cogens or customary international law, is a group of principles of in-
ternational law so fundamental that no nation may ignore them or attempt
to contract out of them through treaties.19 Under the legal system of the
time, there was little redress for foreign nationals injured while in America.
While an alien could sue in state court, this was frequently the home state
of the perpetrator, and prior incidents had shown this to be an unfavorable
forum. 20 There was no recourse for aliens injured by other aliens in the civil
system.2' Foreign nations demanded stronger protection for their citizens
on American soil.22 Many founders were probably fearful that the United
States would lose its tenuous place on the international stage.2 3 Slipping off
the international map would have had disastrous consequences for the new
nation, so the founders brought this issue to Congress's attention to avoid
the predicted crisis.24
The situation that most likely sparked concern and interest in the situ-
ation was the Marbois affair in Pennsylvania in 1784.25 Marbois, the French
Consul General, was assaulted by another Frenchman, DeLongchamps,
while walking on a Philadelphia street. 6 Although Marbois complained to
the Continental Congress at the time, there was little they could do under
the Articles of Confederation. It was left to the state of Pennsylvania to
prosecute the action in the criminal sense.2 7 There was no civil action by
Marbois and it is questionable whether there was a forum to hear the case if
the action had been filed.,8 The entire affair caused outrage among the for-
eign representatives in the country at the time. The Dutch ambassador was
incensed and threatened to leave unless the United States took responsive
action.29 While Pennsylvania did convict De Longchamps of an "offense
18 Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article II1, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587, 643
(2002).
19 Samuel A. Khalil, Note, The Alien Tort Claims Act and Section 1983: The Improper Use of
Domestic Laws to "Crate" and "Define" International Liabilityfor Multi-National Corporations, 31
HOFSTRA L. REV. 207, 216 (2002).
20 Dodge, supra note 7, at 697 (quoting Oliver Ellsworth) ("Juries were too apt to
be biased [against] them, in favor of their own citizens & acquaintances: it was therefore
necessary to have general Courts for causes in which foreigners were parties or citizens of
different States").
2 1 Dodge, supra note 7, at 694-95.
22 Id. at 694.
23 See Daniel Diskin, Note, The Historical and Modern Foundations for Aiding and Abetting
Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, 47 Aiz. L. REv. 805, 813-14 (2005).
24 Bradley, supra note 18, at 643.
25 Dodge, supra note 7, at 694.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 694-95.
29 Id.
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against the law of nations, which [is] part of the law of this state [Pennsylva-
nia],"30 it was doubtful whether other states had the capacity to declare the
violation of the law of nations a crime. 3' Prior to this point, only Connecti-
cut had passed a statute that provided criminal and civil liability for a viola-
tion of the law of nations.32 Additionally, few states provided punishments
for acts against ambassadors.33 These considerations undoubtedly lingered
in the founders' minds when drafting Article III of the United States Con-
stitution34 and they were even more acutely aware of these shortcomings in
drafting the Judiciary Act of 1789.35
In light of this history, Congress must have intended the ATCA to apply
equally to individuals and state actors. The language of the statute makes
no distinction between the two groups. The statute allows for jurisdiction
over "any suit by an alien for a tort only."36 There is no requirement that
the tort be committed by a government entity or an official organization
in order for a cause of action to arise. The origin of the statute strongly
indicates that the drafters intended to allow suits for torts committed by
individual actors.
II. HISTORY OF THE USE OF THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT IN LITIGATION
The law of nations was traditionally very narrow, as was discussed in the
Supreme Court's opinion in Sosa. Justice Souter (citing Blackstone) found
three violations of the law of nations in English criminal law, namely, "vi-
olation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and
piracy."37 The reference to piracy as a law of nations violation clearly an-
swers the question of whether individual liability could arise under the
ATCA. While violations of safe conducts and infringements on the rights
of ambassadors can easily be limited to those acts perpetrated by a nation
or governmental entity, piracy was commonly regarded as an individual's
crime against society. 31
Legal commentators from the earliest times defined pirates as "en-
emies of the human race" and stated that "piracy is justly regarded as a
30 Id.
31 Dodge, supra note 7, at 695-96.
32 Id. at 693.
33 Id. at 695.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (emphasis added).
37 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715.
38 U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820). ("[P]iracy is justly regarded as a crime
against the universal laws of society").
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crime against the universal laws of society.... 39 The U.S. courts further
discussed piracy as the act of an individual against all nations, meaning any
nation might punish a pirate "whether native or foreigner" for his crimes.4°
The common law found piracy to be "an offence against the universal law
of society, a pirate being deemed an enemy of the human race."'4 As one of
the earliest recognized violations of the law of nations, piracy was a crime
often committed in an individual capacity. The United States actively pur-
sued individuals for the crime, as did most other countries.4 2 Because piracy
was an individual crime, it is clear that the law of nations could be violated
by an individual. The wording of the ATCA must allow for the possibil-
ity that individuals could be held civilly liable for violations of the law of
nations.
III. DECISIONS FROM THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Since I980, the Alien Tort Claims Act has been interpreted as applying
to individuals for human rights violations in limited circumstances. The
Second Circuit has been the most instrumental in this area, deciding both
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala in 1980 and Kadic v. Karadzic in 1995. Filartiga arose
from events occurring in Paraguay. All of the parties involved were Para-
guayan citizens. The plaintiffs sued the defendant for his actions in connec-
tion with the torture and death of a close family member of the plaintiffs.43
The defendant had been the Inspector General of Police and had ordered
one plaintiff's son to be tortured and executed because of the plaintiff's
political opposition to the party in power." While the trial court dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals reversed, find-
ing jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act.45 In its decision, the court
held that "an act of torture committed by a state official against one held
in detention violates established norms of the international law of human
rights, and hence the law of nations." 46 The defendant claimed he was
acting in his official capacity as a member of the Paraguayan government
(chief inspector of police), and therefore the Act of State doctrine barred
39 Id. at 163.
40 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 762 (citing Smith, 18 U.S. at 153 and referring to the "general practice
of all nations in punishing all persons, whether natives or foreigners, who have committed
[piracy] against any persons").
41 Id. at 732 (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 E2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 198o)).
42 See Smith, 18 U.S. at 153.
43 Filartiga, 630 F2d at 878.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 88o.
2005- 2oo6 ]
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the action. 47 The Second Circuit found this argument was not properly
raised for appeal. However, the court stated that when a state official is act-
ing contrary to the laws of the state, he could not avail himself of the Act of
State doctrine because it is assumed that he did not have the support of the
government in performing his acts of torture and murder.4s
Fifteen years later, the Second Circuit decided Kadic, which was a suit
for human rights violations in Bosnia under the insurgent Bosnian-Serb
leader, Radovan Karadzic. The trial court again dismissed for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.49 The Second Circuit reversed, stating, "Karadzic
may be found liable for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against human-
ity in his private capacity and for other violations in his capacity as a state
actor."50 The court discussed the requirements for a violation of the law of
nations when it also found that the law of nations is not confined to state
actors.5' Citing authority from early Supreme Court opinions and attorney
general opinions, the Second Circuit determined that private individuals
were subject to liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act for human rights
violations under international law.52
Although the Second Circuit found the possibility for private liability
under the ATCA, it did not extend that possibility to all human rights vio-
lations.5 3 As stated in Kadic, an individual will only incur liability for in-
dividual actions if he or she commits extreme human rights violations54
More precisely, private parties incur liability when they "commit atrocities
in the pursuit of genocide or war crimes." 5 The Court intimated that tor-
ture without the color of authority present in Filartiga would not rise to the
level of a violation of the law of nations.56
All of the defendants in the Second Circuit cases were directly involved
in the human rights violations. Each either committed the tort personally
(as in Filartiga) or had direct control over the persons who committed the
atrocity (as in Kadic). Therefore, the Circuit Court did not address the li-
ability of actors who were only tangentially involved in the two aforemen-
tioned decisions.
47 Id. at 889.
48 Id.
49 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995).
5o Id.
51 Id. at 239.
52 Id. at 239-40.
53 Id. at 244.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 240, 245.
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IV. DECISIONS FROM THE D.C. CIRCUIT
The D.C. Court of Appeals decided Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Repub/ics7 in the
midst of the ATCA decisions coming out of the Second Circuit. Te/-Oren
contains an especially interesting and extensive discussion of the history
of the ATCA and the policies underlying its extension to private actors.
Judges Robb, Bork, and Edwards each wrote separately discussing the ap-
plicability of the ATCA to private individuals.
In Te/-Oren, a group of plaintiffs who were victims of a bus bombing
in Israel sued the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) under the
ATCA for human rights violations in connection with bombing.58 While the
D.C. Circuit upheld the District Court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction,
each judge arrived at that conclusion by a different analysis.59
Judge Edwards accepted the Second Circuit's reasoning in Filariga and
established the court's role in defining the law of nations on the evolving
basis of what customary international law is today.60 While accepting that
litigation brought under the ATCA must be evaluated according to modern
standards of international law, Edwards was reluctant to extend liability to
individuals. Drawing from the Fi/ariga court's opinion that "official" tor-
ture was a violation of international law, Edwards decided that there was
scant evidence that torture by an individual not acting under color of law
was a violation of international law.6' He also rejected the claim that terror-
ism was a crime against the law of nations:
While this nation unequivocally condemns all terrorist acts, that sentiment
is not universal. Indeed, the nations of the world are so divisively split on
the legitimacy of such aggression as to make it impossible to pinpoint an
area of harmony or consensus ... Given this division, I do not believe that
under current law terrorist attacks amount to law of nations violations. 62
Because of these findings, Edwards affirmed the lower court's dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.63
Judge Bork voted to affirm the dismissal for different reasons. First,
he questioned whether a cause of action even exists under the Alien Tort
Claims Act.64 Recognizing that the Second Circuit assumed one existed,
Judge Bork rejected this assumption and stated that "it is essential that
57 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 E2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
58 Id. at 776.
59 Seegenerally T/-Oren, 726 F2d at 774.
6o Id. at 789.
61 Id. at 791.
62 Id. at 795.
63 Id. at 798.
64 Id. at 8oi.
2005- 2oo6 ]
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there be an explicit grant of a cause of action before a private plaintiff be al-
lowed to enforce principles of international law in a federal tribunal."6 s He
subsequently searched through a variety of sources to determine whether
an express cause of action existed and found none.66 Because there was no
cause of action, Judge Bork voted to affirm the decision of the district court
to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.67
Senior Circuit Judge Robb wrote the final opinion for the D.C. Court of
Appeals in the Tel-Oren case. He dismissed the case based on the political
question doctrine.68 Finding that issues of terrorism were within the "ex-
clusive domain of the executive and legislative branches," Judge Robb said
the case against the PLO for the Israeli bus bombing was nonjusticiable. 69
Judge Robb voted to affirm the lower court's dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction without the need to define either the scope or the ap-
plicability of the ATCA.
V. CONGRESS'S RESPONSE
At least partially in response to the fractured Tel-Oren opinion, Congress
enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).70 The TVPA created a
private right of action for individuals injured by torture and extrajudicial
killings.71 This act's passage was motivated by criticism that the ATCA pro-
vided no such cause of action. The TVPA was codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1350,
as an additional provision of the ATCA. 72
The TVPA has significant limitations that make the ATCA remain im-
portant to international tort litigation.73 The TVPA only applies to defen-
dants who act under the color of law or official authority.74 Additionally, it
only applies to torture and murder.75 While the TVPA settles some of the
ambiguity surrounding the ATCA, many questions about the ATCA re-
main for federal courts.
The TVPA provides no real comfort for multinational corporations sued
for violations of customary international law. While a plaintiff can only sue a
65 Id.
66 Id. at 8o8.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 823.
69 Id. at 825.
70 z8 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); see also Justin Lu, Note, Jurisdiction over Non-State Activity
UndertheAlien Tort Claims Act, 35 COLUM. J. ThANSNAT'L L. 531,539 (1997).
71 Lu, supra note 70, at 539.
72 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
73 Lu, supra note 70, at 540.
74 Id.
75 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
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corporation for torture committed under the color of law, this principle was
already established in Kadic and the TVPA serves as no additional protec-
tion. In addition, there are a number of law of nations violations that the
TVPA does not seem to reach by its text.76 These violations are still open
to court interpretation. 77 Whether or not these violations will eventually
incur private liability will be of incredible importance to future corporate
tort litigation.
The more recent developments in customary international law can
be divided into two categories: (i) those where liability will be imposed
upon individual actors; and (2) those where liability will be imposed only
upon official actors. Crimes of genocide, human rights, and war crimes can
carry liability for individual actors. 78 The Second Circuit decided that tor-
ture could be actionable only if performed in an official capacity or under
the color of state authority.79 Classification has not yet occurred for oth-
er deeds.' Rape seems to fall under the latter category logically, but the
Ninth Circuit has indicated that it fell in the first category if it occurred in
connection with any "official" violations of human rights.8 ' Forced labor
may qualify under the former category, but no court has yet ruled on ATCA
applicability to forced labor incidents. This issue will be of particular inter-
est to multinational corporations. Forced labor has been recognized as a hu-
man rights violation.,s If an act must be committed under the color of law
to be a violation of the ATCA, corporations cannot be liable if they do not
control those committing the act of forced labor, even if the government of
the foreign country engages in forced labor.
76 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995). The TVPA requires state action
in order for liability to arise under the statute. Any torts committed by private individuals are
not covered. Additionally, torts like genocide and war crimes, which the Second Circuit has
held to violate the law of nations are not mentioned in the statute. See also Lu, supra note 70,
at 540. The crimes of rape, forced labor, and degradation have been mentioned in litigation
under the ATCA but are not mentioned in the TVPA.
77 Lu, supra note 7o , at 548.
78 Kadic, 70 F3d at 241, 243.
79 Id. at 245.
8o Courts have generally classified the action currently under litigation. Other crimes
that have not brought the level of scrutiny, such as forced labor in Unocal or the environmen-
tal violations in Flores, have not received the classification discussion in the court system.
There may be other crimes not currently at the level of international accord to be considered
violations of the law of nations, but will receive the consensus in the near future that are not
currently classified.
8i Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F3d 932, 953-955 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh'g en banc,
395 F3d 978 (2oo3).
82 Id. at 946.
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VI. THE SOSA OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION
OF THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain arose out of the death of a Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration (DEA) agent in Mexico. 3 Officials of the DEA in the United
States received information implicating Alvarez in the murder. The United
States sought and received an indictment against Alvarez for the murder of
the DEA agent, and the District Court for the Central District of California
issued a warrant for his arrest s4 After discussions with the Mexican govern-
ment to extradite Alvarez to the United States failed, the DEA devised a
plan to have Mexican citizens abduct Alvarez and transport him to El Paso,
Texas, where the DEA would take him into custody. Sosa was a member
of the group that performed the abduction.8 5 Alvarez originally attacked
the validity of the indictment based upon the government's conduct in his
seizure,m but the Supreme Court ruled that his capture did not affect the
legitimacy of the district court's jurisdiction over the case. After the United
States presented its case, Alvarez was acquitted and returned to Mexico. 7
Once in Mexico, Alvarez instituted a suit under the ATCA and the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against those involved in his kidnapping.'
The Supreme Court cited Filariga with approval9 and officially de-
clared that the ATCA should be interpreted under "modern" customary
international law.9° Therefore, courts must determine whether jurisdiction
exists based on the modern understanding of international law and the
evolving law regarding human rights issues.9' This put to rest all claims
that the ATCA only applied to causes of action that existed under the stat-
ute when it passed in 1789. This interpretation of the ATCA also opens the
door for litigation based on behavior that has not yet risen to the status of
customary international law but that could rise to that level eventually.92
For example, while the Second Circuit has ruled that pollution is not viola-
tive of customary international law at this point in time, it is possible that
a cause of action under the ATCA for damage caused by pollution could
arise at a later date.
The Sosa defendants claimed partially that the ATCA was merely a ju-
risdictional statute granting federal district courts the power to hear cases
83 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,697 (2004).
84 Id. at 697-98.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 731-32.
90 Id. at 725.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 746. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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brought by aliens for tortious actions committed against them. The defen-
dant further claimed that without action by Congress declaring what causes
of action existed under the ATCA, no cases could be brought under the
statute.93 This argument is very similar to the argument advanced by Judge
Bork in his Tel-Oren opinion. 94 The Supreme Court rejected both the de-
fendant's argument and the reasoning of Judge Bork, instead determining
that the ATCA was not merely a jurisdictional statute and that the history
of the act indicated that causes of action need not be explicitly created by
Congress. 95 Piracy and attacks against ambassadors were causes of action
that existed at the time the ATCA was passed. These causes of action were
founded in the common law and were not created by Congressional ac-
tion.96 Therefore, liability could arise in additional contexts according to
evolving customary international law without Congress declaring such ac-
tions to exist under the statute.
The Court also used the decision by the D.C. Court of Appeals in Tel-
Oren to limit the ATCA and caution the lower courts about expanding its
interpretation.97 While rejecting Judge Bork's contention that no cause of
action existed under the ATCA without an express grant by Congress, the
Court found his warning against interpreting the ATCA too broadly to be
persuasive.98 The Court reiterated Judge Bork's opinion that broad inter-
pretation would lead to uncertain and expansive litigation. 99
The Court dictated the instances when a new cause of action shall be
deemed to have arisen to minimize the uncertainty associated with new
causes of action.' Customary international law does not encompass con-
duct unless almost all nations agreed that the behavior at issue was wrong-
ful and deserving of punishment.'0 ' While there need not be unanimous
consent among the nations of the world, a majority is not sufficient to make
an expansion of international law.10z The Supreme Court discussed factors
to consider in determining whether the behavior in question was a violation
of modern international law.' °3 However, the court did not assign weight to
93 Id. at 712.
94 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 E2d 774, 8o (D.C. Cir. 1984).
95 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004).
96 Id. at 72o-2 1.
97 Id. at 727-28.
98 Tel-Oren, 726 F2d at 813.
99 Sosa, 542 U.S at 727.
oo Id. at 732.
IO Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (zd Cir. 198o).
102 While little is said about the actual number of countries needed to make an action a
violation of the law of nations, a reasonable assumption that can be made from Justice Souter's
opinion is that some form of "super majority" will be required before an action will rise to a
violation of customary international law.
103 Sosa, 542 U.S at 732-33.
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the factors or adopt a bright line number of factors that must be present to
qualify the conduct as violating international law. 104 Justice Souter said that
international agreements provide some indication of a country's willing-
ness to abide by certain standards, but such agreements are not dispositive
in establishing whether the conduct violates international law. 105
The ATCA originally covered limited actions that modern international
entities all viewed with distaste. For example, piracy was a personal crime
all nations punished regardless of the nationality of the pirate. The Court
said that new causes of action under the ATCA must have an equivalent
consensus among the international community that piracy garnered in
I789.'06 This statement sets a high bar; in U.S. v. Smith, decided in 1820,
Justice Story said, "There is scarcely a writer on the law of nations, who does
not allude to piracy as a crime of a settled and determinate nature." 107
VII. THE COURT'S SILENCE ON INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY UNDER THE ATCA
While the Court in Sosa mentioned the consideration of individual liability
under the ATCA, it made no definitive ruling with regard to whether it ex-
ists.' °0 The Supreme Court does not address the scope of the ATCA with
regard to non-state actors. The DEA agents in Sosa were clearly govern-
ment actors and were subject to liability under the statute. Sosa, one of the
Mexican citizens who participated in the kidnapping, derived his power
to abduct Alvarez from the DEA, and so can also be considered a state
actor.' 9 The DEA did authorize Sosa to perform the kidnapping.1I0 The
Court mentions private actor liability only once, in footnote 20, without
passing judgment on whether private actors would be considered under
the "scope of liability" of international law." The Supreme Court cites
both Tel-Oren and Kadic, where the D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit
reached opposing results in whether private liability exists, making the de-
termination even more difficult for lower courts when trying the interpret
the applicability of Sosa to cases involving private actors." 2 However, since
private actors have been held liable on the international stage at least since
World War II, it would seem odd if the Supreme Court did not find suffi-
104 Id.
105 Id. at 735.
io6 Id. at 732.
107 U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 16i (182o).
io8 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732, nl.2.
io9 Hufbauer, supra note 3, at 8o.
1io Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698.
ii Id. at 733, n.20.
112 Id.
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cient international accord to extend liability to multinational corporations
in most settings." 3
VIII. OTHER ISSUES NOT ADDRESSED IN SOSA AND STILL
OPEN FOR INTERPRETATION
Because of the facts of Sosa, the Supreme Court did not have the oppor-
tunity to address a few aspects of the ATCA that are very important to
corporate liability under it. For instance, because in Sosa the DEA agents
and the Mexican nationals were directly involved in Alvarez's kidnapping,
there is no discussion of whether defendants under the ATCA can be vi-
cariously liable."I4 Vicarious liability as a theory is of central importance
in corporate cases." s The Supreme Court similarly did not address issues
such as the statute of limitations under the ATCA and exhaustion of rem-
edies."6 Justice Souter acknowledged that the exhaustion of remedies
analysis was currently undecided and could be the source of future litiga-
tion, but did not address it in the Sosa opinion, as the facts did not require
the discussion.' '7
IX. THE SCOPE OF CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATCA
It has been argued that courts should use the ATCA to exercise jurisdic-
tion over the activities of multinational corporations in an effort to halt
the rising exploitation of foreign laws for the benefit of corporations." In
practice, courts have been reluctant to adopt this expansive view of the
ATCA." 9 Without substantial supporting information in international ac-
cords, courts will not find a cause of action arising under the ATCA.
While the Second Circuit has taken a moderate approach to interpreting
the ATCA in cases involving human rights violations, other circuits have
developed different rules of law of when individual liability applies. '20 For
113 David D. Christensen, Note, Corporate Liability for Overseas Human Rights Abuses: The
Alien Tort Statute After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 62 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1219, 1222-23
(2o5).
114 Hufbauer, supra note 3, at 8I.
115 Id.
i16 Id. at 79-8o.
117 Id. at 8i.
1I8 Lorelle Londis, Comment, The Corporate Face of the Alien Tort Claims Act: How an Old
Statute Mandates a New Understanding of Global Interdependence, 57 ME. L. REV. 141, 2o8 (2005).
i 19 Id. at 142-43.
120 Marc Rosen, Note, The Alien Tort Claims Act and The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:
A Policy Solution, 6 CAiDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 461, 476-77 (1998).
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example, The D.C. Court of Appeals interpreted the statute more narrowly
in Tel-Oren.'2 This could have a significant impact on corporations and their
potential liability for human rights violations where they operate. There
have been a few cases since I980 that have sought to hold corporations li-
able for human rights violations. 122
While most cases on this issue have been decided by the Second Circuit,
the Southern District of New York addressed it in theSouth African Apart-
heid cases.' 23 In 2004, the district court sought to apply the decisions of the
Second Circuit in ATCA litigation to a case involving several multinational
corporations. Plaintiffs sought to hold multinational corporations liable for
human rights violations that occurred in South Africa during apartheid.24
The court held that the plaintiffs had not presented facts sufficient to show
the corporations acted under color of law or engaged in joint action with
the apartheid regime. ' 2s More specifically, the court found that although the
corporations had benefited from the apartheid system (because of access
to cheaper labor and power), their actions were not recognized as inter-
national law violations, and therefore there was no jurisdiction under the
Alien Tort Claims Act. 126
Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co. stated similar rules.27 The Bigios were deprived
of their property by the Egyptian government because of their ethnicity."2'
After the Bigios had been divested of their property, the Egyptian govern-
ment sold the land to the Coca-Cola Company.29 The Second Circuit ruled
that an indirect economic benefit is not enough to show a corporation has
violated international law.130 There was no evidence that Coca-Cola was
involved in the property taking or persuaded the government to seize the
Bigios' property for the corporation's benefit.' 3' The Second Circuit con-
cluded that the plaintiffs failed to plead a law of nations violation under
the ATCA.' 32
12 1 Id. at 477-78.
122 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 E3d 932
(9th Cir. 2002), vacatedandreh'gen bane, 395 F3d 978 (2003); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 E3d 232 (2d
Cir. 1995); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 E2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
123 In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 E Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
124 Id. at 542.
125 Id. at 548.
iz6 Id. at 545.
127 Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 E3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000).
128 Id. at444.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 449.
131 Id. at 447.
132 Id. at 449.
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The other Second Circuit decision in this area was Flores v. Southern Peru
Copper Corp. 133 The plaintiffs sued for lung damage suffered because of the
corporation's actions in Peru.'34 The court held that rights to health and life
were insufficiently definite to be binding rules of customary international
law to form a basis for subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA.'13 Judge
Cabranes employed language similar to that of Justice Souter in the later
Sosa opinion when discussing when new causes of action arise under the
ATCA.' 36 Judge Cabranes held that the existence of a rule of customary
international law against intranational pollution was not established to pro-
vide a basis for jurisdiction under the ATCA.137
The most recent case on corporate liability under the ATCA is a case
recently settled in the Ninth Circuit. In Doe v. Unocal Corp.,'38 Myanmar 39
citizens sued an American corporation for human rights violations that oc-
curred in connection with the construction of a natural gas pipeline through
the Tenasserim region. 140 Unocal is a California corporation that owns twen-
ty-eight percent of the French company involved in the pipeline's con-
struction.' 4' The Myanmar military was responsible for the security of the
construction and provided a variety of other services in connection with
this responsibility.' 4 2 The plaintiffs in the lawsuit alleged that the Myan-
mar military forced them to serve as laborers for the pipeline, threatening
them with violence if they refused. '43 They further testified that the Myan-
mar military used rape, torture, and murder to ensure compliance with the
forced labor program.' 44 The plaintiffs complained that Unocal knew of
these activities, had the power to prevent them in their control of the mili-
tary working on the project, and yet did nothing to stop the human rights
violations from occurring.'14
The District Court for the Central District of California dismissed or
resolved all claims in favor of the defendant corporation. 146 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reversed in part, and affirmed in part, and remanded the is-
133 Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 E3d 140 (ad Cir. 2003), republished at 414 F3d
233 (2d Cir. 2003).
134 Id. at 143.
135 Id. at 16o.
136 Id. at 161; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731-33 (2004).
137 Flores,343 E3d at i61.
138 Unocal, 395 F3d at 932.
139 Myanmar is the current name for the country formerly called Burma.
140 Id. at 936.
141 Id. at 937.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 939.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 939,956.
146 Id. at 943-44.
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sue for further proceedings. 47 The Ninth Circuit held that Unocal could
be held personally liable for the actions of the Myanmar military under the
ATCA if Unocal was found to have "aided or abetted" the military in sub-
jecting Myanmar citizens to forced labor.' 48 Since there was evidence that
Unocal at least knew of the military's actions in building the oil pipeline,
the Ninth Circuit remanded for further proceedings to establish liability
under the ATCA for forced labor, murder, and rape. 49 In December 2004,
Unocal announced that the parties in the litigation had reached a settle-
ment. The terms of the settlement were confidential. 'so
The Ninth Circuit has gone a step further in the analysis by stating that
actual knowledge is not required for a finding of liability under the ATCA.'1'
If reasonable proof existed that the corporation "should have known" its
actions would encourage a state actor to commit a violation of customary
international law, it can be charged with constructive knowledge of the
event.'52 Lawyers for future plaintiffs may find this constructive knowledge
rule easy to apply to a number of situations. s3 If a court finds a corporation
should have known of the influence its actions would have on other state
actors, such a finding would go far in establishing that a corporation "aided
or abetted" the foreign government in its tortious acts.
It is unclear what level of involvement by Unocal would be required to
make the company liable for human rights violations. All previous litigation
under the ATCA has been against actors directly involved in the violations.
Most defendants were in a position to advance the perpetration of crimes
that violated international law. Karadzic was the leader of an insurgent fac-
tion that had taken control of a region in Bosnia and declared it the Re-
public of Srpska.'s4 Pena-Irala was the Inspector General of Police.'SS The
defendants in Sosa were the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency officers who
authorized the kidnapping, as well as the Mexican nationals who physically
carried out the kidnapping, of a Mexican citizen who was accused of be-
ing connected to the murder of a DEA agent in Mexico.' s6 The plaintiffs
in Unocal premised their claim on Unocal's position of authority over the
pipeline construction. s5
147 Id. at 962-63.
148 Id. at 947-53.
149 Id. at 962-63.
15o Armin Rosencranz & David Louk, Doe v. Unocal: Holding Corporations Liable for
Human Rights Abuses on Their Watch, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 135, 148 (2005).
151 Unocal, 395 F3d at 953.
152 Id.
153 Hufbauer, supra note 3, at 79.
154 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F3d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1995).
155 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 198o).
156 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 698 (2004).
157 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F3d 932,936 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh'g en bane, 395
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The Second Circuit determined that there is no affirmative duty on
corporations to prevent human rights violations committed by a foreign
government independent of the corporation's actions in the country.158 In
the Unocal case, the violations were not divorced from the corporation's
presence in the country. In fact, the forced labor came about as a direct
result of Unocal's desire to build a natural gas pipeline through the region.
The plaintiffs in the case argued that the military, which was present to
protect the building of the pipeline, introduced forced labor into the con-
struction.'19 The link between Unocal's presence and the military's actions
cannot be severed, according to the plaintiffs.'16
The Ninth Circuit ruled that such interrelation of the activities could
impose liability.'6' The court did not discuss whether this was in further-
ance of the Second Circuit's ruling in Bigio or in opposition to it. If the
Ninth Circuit chooses to reject the Second Circuit's findings in Bigio v.
Coca-Cola Corp., it will set up a conflict between circuits that will likely last
until the Supreme Court has the opportunity to define further the scope of
the ATCA. Until a Supreme Court decision, the Ninth Circuit could find
itself overwhelmed by litigation because it has a more favorable stance to-
ward plaintiffs in cases arising under the ATCA.
It is not yet clear whether mere knowledge of the atrocities is enough to
impose liability. If so, the Unocal opinion will have harmful effects on mul-
tinational corporations and could severely impede global trade and inter-
national dealings. 62 Corporations would have to develop divisions of their
operations to deal with research and evaluation of a foreign government's
history of human rights violations' 63 and would be discouraged from invest-
ing in countries with histories of human rights violations. ,64 Past actions may
be enough to impute knowledge of future violations. This could disrupt
corporate development in nations such as China, Saudi Arabia, and various
developing countries now entering the global market.' 65 Such a result is
incompatible with the current global economy. It would be impossible for
companies to cut off activities in these countries or refrain from developing
business ties with the governments of these countries. However, with the
Ninth Circuit's indication that Unocal could have been liable for "aiding
and abetting" the Myanmar government in its violations of human rights
E3d 978 (2003).
158 Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F3d 440, 449 (2d Cir. 2ooo).
159 Unocal, 395 E3d at 939.
i6o Id. at 940.
16I Id. at 938-42.
162 Hufbauer, supra note 3, at 84-85.
163 Id. at 85.
164 Id. at 84.
165 Id. at 85.
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by having had knowledge of the violations and refusing to act to minimize
or eliminate the violations, corporations will be reluctant to enter countries
such as Myanmar for fear of overwhelming liability. As a practical matter,
it is unlikely that corporations could exert such influence to stop foreign
governments from committing human rights violations.' 66
XII. CONCLUSION
Lawsuits against corporations in connection with human rights violations
in foreign countries are a recent phenomenon. Practically speaking, courts
in only two circuits have had the opportunity to address the issue, the
Second Circuit in the Northeast and the Ninth Circuit in the West. The
different conclusions reached by these courts will likely increase civil ac-
tions against corporations in the future. The New York District Court ruled
that corporate actions during the South African Apartheid system were not
enough for liability to arise under the ATCA.'67 The Ninth Circuit held
that "aiding and abetting" a government in violating human rights could
violate international law. 68 The factual inquiry of how much involvement
is "too much" will prove too debilitating for lower courts to establish li-
ability guidelines.
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue, only recently de-
fining the scope of the ATCA in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.'69 In order to assist
the Circuits in applying a uniform interpretation of the law of nations to
corporations, the Supreme Court will need to address the liability of corpo-
rations doing business in countries that commit human rights violations but
do not violate the law themselves.
Additionally, the Circuits need to focus on the cautionary language in
the Sosa opinion to maintain a consistent application of the law across dif-
ferent districts until the Supreme Court can more fully define causes of ac-
tion that can arise under the ATCA.' 70 There is a danger of vastly different
decisions arising among the circuits. This will lead to confusion on the part
of multinational corporations as to which law they need to follow. Where
corporations can be subject to any court's jurisdiction, it will be nearly im-
possible to comply properly with all the tests if there is no uniform inter-
pretation of when the ATCA will apply. Plaintiffs will undoubtedly use this
166 Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F3d 440,449 (2d Cir. 2000).
167 In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F Supp. 2d 538, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
168 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F3d 932,947 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh'g en banc, 395
F3d 978 (2003).
169 Hufbauer, supra note 3, at 79.
170 Christensen, supra note 113, at 1268-70.
[Vol. 94
2005- 2006 ] CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER ATCA 667
to their advantage by suing in circuits that have interpreted the statute to
its broadest terms.
The ATCA exists to give a forum to aliens for torts committed against
them by people who can be found in the United States. The Supreme
Court has not given any definite guidance on the issue of a private individ-
ual's liability under the ATCA. In this light, Courts should resist the urge
to graft moral ideals onto the ATCA in order to exert jurisdiction over cer-
tain claims. Courts should restrain themselves to causes of action that arise
from violations of laws that a majority of nations declare as violations of
international law. Only in doing this can courts remain true to the original
intent of the statute and allow the global economy to develop to its fullest
potential.

